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Abstract
This article addresses four major concerns about the pay of U.S. CEOs: (1) failure to pay for performance; (2)
excessive levels of pay; (3) failure to index options and other equity-based pay, resulting in windfalls; and (4)
too much unwinding of incentives. The authors' main message is that most if not all of these concerns are
exaggerated by the popular tendency to focus on the annual income of CEOs (consisting of salary, bonus, and
stock and option grants) while ignoring their existing holdings of company equity.
Taking into account the effect of stock price changes on CEO wealth leads the authors to a number of
interesting conclusions. First, the pay-for-performance relationship is strong and has grown significantly in
recent years. Second, what may appear as above-normal growth in annual pay levels may be necessary to
compensate CEOs for the increased risk associated with their growing level of equity-based incentives. Third,
conventional (that is, unindexed) stock and options, when viewed as a combination of market risk and firm-
specific risk, may provide an optimal solution to two conflicting demands: shareholders' demand for executive
rewards tied to company performance and executives' preference to diversify their wealth. Finally, there is little
evidence of widespread CEO unwinding of incentives, and levels of CEO equity ownership in the U.S. remain
impressively high.
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Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay without Performance? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 In this paper, we review Pay Without Performance by Professors Lucian Bebchuk 
and Jesse Fried. The book develops and summarizes the leading critiques of current 
executive compensation practices in the U.S., and offers a negative, if mainstream, 
assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation 
practices are failing, and systemic reform is needed. This review summarizes the book in 
some detail and offers some counter-arguments. 
 The book's thesis is that executive compensation practices are bad for 
shareholders (not "optimal") because they are the product of "managerial power." 
Managerial power arises because boards of directors at public companies are not 
independent of executives. Weak compensation committees thus do little to protect the 
firm in its pay negotiations with the CEO, leading to levels of executive pay that are both 
inappropriately high and have inappropriately low levels of incentives.   
The authors offer a four part analysis of CEO pay.  First, they describe and 
critique optimal contracting theory, which posits that executive compensation 
arrangements are designed to benefit shareholders.  Second, they explain managerial 
power theory, in part through an in-depth analysis of current executive compensation 
practices. They assert the managerial power theory provides a superior explanation of 
current practices to the optimal contracting perspective. They also draw the strong 
implication that if managerial power exists, it means that something is wrong with the 
contracting process. Third, they claim that CEO compensation does not vary sufficiently 
with firm performance. They conclude with policy recommendations for changing 
compensation plans and improving corporate governance, for example by requiring that 
directors be more independent. 
We agree that it is useful to consider the effect of managerial power on 
compensation, but we disagree with their interpretation of the consequences of this 
power. It is true that contract structures reflect CEO power, and that CEOs with more 
power get more pay, but this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that CEO pay is 
not optimized for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs reform. We show 
that in many settings where managerial power exists, observed contracts anticipate and 
try to minimize the costs of this power, and therefore may in fact be written optimally. As 
a result, the optimal contracting and managerial power perspectives are complementary, 
and not competing, explanations.   
We next examine Bebchuk and Fried's claim that U.S. compensation is inefficient 
"pay without performance." Their analysis focuses on whether CEO annual pay varies 
with firm performance. While the book conducts an extensive analysis of the incentives 
provided by annual grants of stock options and equity it largely ignores the main source 
of CEO incentives: Large holdings of stock and options. These large equity holdings 
provide powerful performance incentives and ensure that the wealth of most CEOs varies 
strongly with their firm's stock price. The books' claim that CEO compensation is "pay 
without performance" does not appear correct once one considers this main source of 
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CEO incentives. U.S. executives have very large pay-performance incentives, and their 
overall pay levels do not seem inappropriate. 
We conclude by examining some of Bebchuk and Fried's policy 
recommendations. Bebchuk and Fried have missed some important aspects of executive 
pay and incentives. They have not shown that there are systematic failures with U.S. 
CEO compensation, and therefore have not shown that reform is needed. 
 
 3
Introduction 
 
In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk1 and Jesse Fried2 
develop and summarize the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices 
in the United States. This book, and their highly influential earlier article, “Managerial 
Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,” with David 
Walker3 offer a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive 
compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing in a widespread manner, 
and much systemic reform is needed. The purpose of our Review is to summarize the 
book and to offer some counterarguments to try to balance what is becoming an 
increasingly one-sided debate.  
The book’s thesis is that executive compensation practices in the U.S. benefit 
corporate executives at the expense of shareholders through implicit and explicit 
corruption of the pay-setting process. It argues that CEO employment contracts are bad 
for shareholders (not "optimal") because they are the product of “managerial power.”  
“Managerial power” arises, the authors claim, because boards of directors at public 
companies are beholden to the firm’s top executives, largely due to management’s 
control over the director nomination process.  Weak compensation committees thus do 
little to protect the firm in its pay negotiations with the CEO, leading to levels of 
executive pay that are both inappropriately high and have inappropriately low levels of 
incentives.  The only constraint on this process is “outrage,” either among the firm’s 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
2 Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law. 
3 Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried and David Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 751 (2002).  
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shareholders or the general public.  This outrage constraint, however, only polices 
extreme cases of executive overcompensation. 
In support of this claim, the authors offer a four-part analysis of CEO pay.  In part 
one, they begin with a short description and critique of optimal contracting theory, which 
posits that executive compensation arrangements are designed to benefit shareholders.4  
After developing their arguments against the optimal contracting thesis, they go on in part 
two to explain their version of managerial power theory, in part through an in-depth 
analysis of current executive compensation practices.  Having claimed to establish the 
superiority of managerial-power theory to optimal contracting, in part three the authors 
provide a more detailed critique of the relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance.  They assert the managerial-power theory provides a superior explanation 
of current practices to the optimal-contracting perspective.  They also draw the strong 
implication that if such power exists, it means that something is wrong with the 
contracting process. They conclude with their policy recommendations to address what 
they perceive to be the failings of executive-pay practices. 
While we agree with some of the analysis offered in Pay Without Performance,5 
we think it is important to put its arguments into perspective. In a nutshell, the key issue 
is whether the problems Bebchuk and Fried discuss are examples of a few bad apples or 
                                                 
4 As we discuss below in Section II, Bebchuk and Fried do not directly critique optimal contracting theory, 
but instead critique the lack of "arm's length contracts," which are a very restrictive subset of optimal 
contracts. Because contracts will only be "arm's length" when there are no contracting costs and no 
transactions costs, the "arm's length" standard is a questionable benchmark, and is not typically used by 
economists, who prefer to examine whether contracts are optimized to maximize share value net of 
contracting and transactions costs. 
5 For example, we think some of their policy recommendations have merit and deserve careful 
consideration.  See Section IV infra for further discussion of some of these points. 
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are evidence that the whole barrel is rotten.6  The essence of their claim that the entire 
barrel is bad rests on the following assumption: If contracts are optimal, they do not 
reflect managerial power, and if contracts reflect managerial power, they are suboptimal. 
The authors view evidence of managerial power as evidence that the system is failing and 
that reform is needed.   
We agree that it is useful to consider the effect of managerial power on 
compensation, but disagree with their interpretation of the consequences of such power.  
It is true that contract structures reflect CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get 
more pay, but this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that CEO pay is not 
optimized for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs reform. 
More generally, our Review points out that Bebchuk and Fried have missed some 
important aspects of executive pay and incentives.  As a result, they have not shown that 
there are systematic failures with U.S. CEO compensation, and therefore have not shown 
that reform is needed.  
We try to accomplish this task in the following manner.  We begin in Part I by 
summarizing what we see as the main themes of the book in some detail. This overview 
sets the stage for us in Part II to carefully define what we understand to be the “optimal 
contract” perspective and “managerial power” perspective.  We then show that in many 
settings where “managerial power” exists, observed contracts anticipate and try to 
minimize the costs of this power, and therefore may in fact be written optimally.7 As a 
result, the two perspectives are complementary, not competing, explanations.  
                                                 
6 Bebchuk and Fried introduce their book with the suggestion that the barrel is rotten by quoting Harvard 
Business School Dean Kim Clark: "Is it a problem of bad apples, or is it the barrel?" P. 1. 
7 As we discuss in detail in Section II.A below, an optimal contract is not a perfect contract, but the best 
contract that can be achieved given the contracting costs in a given situation. 
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In Part III, we examine Bebchuk and Fried’s claim that U.S. CEO compensation 
is inefficient “pay without performance.” We note that their analysis focuses primarily on 
whether CEO annual pay varies with firm performance, and that this perspective ignores 
the lion’s share of CEOs’ incentives: the large holdings of stock and options that provide 
powerful performance incentives and ensure that the wealth of most CEOs varies strongly 
with their firm’s stock price. Thus, we believe that the authors’ claim that CEO pay is 
“Pay without Performance” is based on a mischaracterization of the structure of U.S. 
CEO compensation and incentives.  
Finally, we conclude by briefly examining some of Bebchuk and Fried's policy 
recommendations and summarizing our main points. 
 
I.  Overview of the Book 
 
 In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried assert 
that American executives are vastly overpaid by their overly friendly boards of directors. 
Bebchuk and Fried argue that current executive pay practices are a sign of widespread 
corporate governance failures, a view that they believe to be supported by scholarly 
research on executive compensation.  
The departure point for their project is the large increases in U.S. CEO pay 
between 1992 and 2000 (e.g., see Table Two below). Bebchuk and Fried maintain that 
current pay arrangements are inefficient and excessive, and are the result of “managerial 
power” and a lack of “arm’s-length bargaining.” On the other hand some financial 
economists are hesitant to conclude that current pay practices reflect a poorly functioning 
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market for executive labor and question the generalizability of the managerial power 
perspective.8   
Bebchuk and Fried argue that the negotiations that take place between boards and 
CEOs over pay are distinctly one-sided in favor of the executive.  Boards do not, and 
cannot, act as effective monitors of management because their members, even supposedly 
independent ones, are beholden to CEOs for a host of financial, social and psychological 
reasons. Other players in the corporate governance field are either too weak, too unaware 
of the facts, or too interested in preserving the status quo, to do anything about it.  In 
short, the thesis of the book is that the U.S. executive compensation system is broken and 
that serious corporate governance reform is needed to fix it.   
 
Part I —The Arm’s-length Bargaining Model 
 
 Bebchuk and Fried begin with a description of the “official,” or “arm’s-length 
bargaining” model, which they claim informs most financial economists’ research. This 
model rests on the widely accepted agency-cost model of the American corporation: 
diffuse ownership of large corporations leaves substantial discretion in professional 
managers’ hands as to how to run the company, and managers can use this discretion in 
ways that do not maximize shareholder value.  The resulting agency costs can be reduced 
through a variety of methods, including the use of a monitoring board of directors.  Such 
                                                 
8 For example, see Kevin Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the 
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 University of Chicago Law Review 847 (2002); Holmstrom and 
Kaplan, The State of Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong, EGCI Working Paper 
Series in Finance (2003). For two recent surveys of research on executive pay and incentives, see Kevin J. 
Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 Handbook of Labor Economics 2485, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and 
David Card (1999); John Core, Wayne Guay and David Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and 
Incentives: A Survey, 9 Econ. Policy Review 27 (2003). 
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a board will leave much discretion in the hands of managers, but oversee executives’ 
actions in an attempt to minimize, but not eliminate, the agency costs resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control.   
As part of the effort to minimize agency costs, executive compensation is 
designed to provide incentives that reward managers for acting in ways that benefit 
shareholders. Theory predicts that boards will use schemes that pay each executive their 
reservation wage, which is the value of the next best opportunity available to the 
manager, plus a premium for bearing the risk that comes with incentives that tie the 
manager’s wealth to changes in shareholder value.  These incentives induce the executive 
to exercise their discretion to create more shareholder value.  When the firm’s success 
depends heavily upon the decisions and effort level of its executives, then compensation 
contracts should be highly incentivized. As the amount of incentives is increased, 
however, so is the risk premium that executives demand, resulting in higher pay. An 
effective incentive contract maximizes the benefits of increasing shareholder value 
through incentives net the costs of paying for these higher incentives.  
Bebchuk and Fried argue that this model assumes that executive compensation 
arrangements are the product of “arm’s-length bargaining between the executive and a 
board seeking to maximize shareholder value.” (p. 18).  They then ask the question of 
whether this assumption comports with the reality in the marketplace.  Here, they contend 
the answer is a resounding no.   
Directors, in Bebchuk and Fried’s view, are heavily biased against engaging in 
arm’s-length negotiations for CEO pay.  They offer a long list of reasons for this,  
including: CEOs control, or at least strongly influence, who sits on the board, and board 
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members want to be reelected to continue to enjoy the many benefits of board 
membership; CEOs can award benefits to directors, directly or indirectly, by hiring their 
firms, or contributing to their favorite charities; CEOs have significant influence over 
director compensation, with higher CEO pay being correlated to higher director pay; and 
a host of social and psychological factors, such as friendship, loyalty, and collegiality.  
On the other side of the equation, directors have relatively few reasons to oppose higher 
CEO pay as long as it falls “within the range of what is considered conventional and 
acceptable.” (p. 36). Higher pay, claim Bebchuk and Fried, has little direct financial 
impact on directors as they usually hold little stock in the company and gain few or no 
reputational benefits from holding down CEO pay.  Furthermore, even well-intentioned 
and hard-nosed compensation-committee members lack the time to do much more than 
rely on outside consultants for information and advice, with these advisors also having 
strong incentives to give the CEO what they want.9  Bebchuk and Fried conclude, 
therefore, that boards are not bargaining at arm’s-length with CEOs. 
 If that is true, then what other meaningful checks exist for executive pay? 
Shareholders lack direct power to set compensation for top managers but do have indirect 
ways of influencing pay levels through filing law suits, or voting for shareholder 
resolutions and against management-sponsored option plans.  Bebchuk and Fried claim 
that litigation is a very limited check on excessive executive pay plans.  Courts are ill-
equipped to judge the desirability of compensation levels and practices, so judges 
typically apply the business judgment rule in evaluating executive pay levels unless there 
are serious process problems.  In fact, they believe that “almost all cases since 1900 have 
                                                 
9 Bebchuk and Fried further claim that the same dynamic applies to newly hired outside CEOs because 
directors have the same incentives to please and get along with them plus a strong interest in insuring that 
they get the candidate they want to be the new CEO.  Pp. 39-41. 
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refused to overturn compensation decisions made by boards of publicly traded firms.”10  
Nor do they see much hope of that record changing in the future, despite recent Delaware 
court decisions in favor of shareholders challenging executive compensation.11
 In the voting arena, NYSE and NASDAQ rules adopted in 2003 require 
shareholder votes on all stock option plans.  Bebchuk and Fried, however, do not believe 
that this will affect executive compensation levels in a meaningful way, despite research 
showing that high negative shareholder votes on option plans lead directors to reduce the 
rate of executive pay increases. They claim that option plans are rarely defeated, that 
even if such plans are voted down, boards can still substitute other forms of 
compensation, and that shareholders may be hurting themselves by vetoing these plans.  
They conclude that “shareholder voting on option plans has been a very weak constraint 
on compensation arrangements.” (p. 51). 
 Markets represent another potential disciplinary force on executive pay levels: the 
managerial labor market, the market for corporate control, the product market, and the 
equity capital market may all reduce the likelihood of excessive executive pay.  Bebchuk 
and Fried claim these markets are weak constraints on managers’ remuneration though, 
for several reasons.  First, they argue that the managerial labor market does not reduce, 
                                                 
10 In support of this claim, Bebchuk and Fried cite a descriptive article by Professor Barris.  P. 46 n.1.  
However, they do not mention contrary results in an empirical analysis of a large number of executive 
compensation cases by one of the authors of this review, although they cite the article.  This study found 
that in public company litigation challenging executive compensation, shareholder plaintiffs have obtained 
favorable judicial opinions in different stages of the litigation in 32% of the cases in that sample.  Randall 
S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 
Wash. U.L.Q. 569, 588, 611 (2001). 
11 In particular, two new Delaware Chancery Court decisions place the burden on incumbent managers to 
insure that their own employment contracts are negotiated “in an adversarial and arms-length manner.”  In 
re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 290 (Del. Ch. 2003); Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors of Integrated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins, 2004 Del Ch. Lexis 122 (August 24, 2004), at *60.  
These decisions make clear that an officer’s fiduciary duties to their corporations extend to acting “honestly 
and in good faith so as not to advantage himself at the expense of the [entity’s] shareholders.” Official 
Committee, supra, at *60.  
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and may actually increase, CEO pay.  Their argument runs as follows: although an 
internal promotion for the current CEO is impossible, CEOs can receive attractive offers 
from other firms, and may try to behave themselves with respect to excess pay to increase 
their attractiveness.  Bebchuk and Fried assert, however, the primary determinant of 
being hired by another firm is the executive’s performance, not their prior pay level, and 
hence executives might as well grab all they can from their current firm.  Furthermore, if 
the executive receives an external offer of employment, it will raise the CEO’s pay even 
more as the new firm will at least match the executive’s old pay in order to induce them 
to leave. 
 The market for corporate control is, in Bebchuk and Fried’s eyes, also a weak 
constraint on executive pay.  In theory, high executive compensation levels could lead to 
a drop in a firm’s stock price and make the firm more vulnerable to a potential takeover.  
The fear of a potential takeover could thus constrain a CEO’s demands for higher pay.  
The authors note, however, hostile takeovers are rare these days and even if one occurs, 
departing executives are frequently richly rewarded by “golden parachutes” and other 
types of payments.  Overall, Bebchuk and Fried claim that executives gain far more from 
pay increases than they lose through the increased likelihood of a takeover that could 
result from excessive executive pay. 
 Finally, Bebchuk and Fried deal briefly with the equity and product markets.  
They believe that capital markets do not effectively check executive pay because firms 
rarely raise equity capital, and even when they do, high executive pay does not cut off a 
firm’s access to the equity markets, but just raises the cost of equity.  Product markets, 
according to the authors, are rarely competitive and thus high CEO pay merely diverts 
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money away from shareholders into executives’ pockets.  Furthermore, high pay is 
unlikely in Bebchuk and Fried’s view to adversely affect a firm’s operational efficiency, 
and even if it did, they claim executives would still gain more from higher pay than they 
would lose from the increased risk of firm failure.  Overall, the authors conclude that 
“market forces are unlikely to impose tight constraints on executive compensation.  They 
may … deter managers from deviating extremely far from arm’s-length contracting 
arrangements, but overall they permit substantial departures from that benchmark.” (p. 
58).  
 Bebchuk and Fried conclude that the arm’s-length bargaining model, as they 
describe it, does not adequately explain current executive compensation practices.  
Boards are not negotiating CEO pay using the type of labor negotiating tactics they use 
with the rank and file, and other corporate stakeholders do not, and presently cannot, 
force them to do so. 
 
Part II – Managerial Power Model 
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 Bebchuk and Fried’s version of the managerial power model12 begins with the 
same agency cost model of the corporation used by the arm’s-length negotiation model, 
but differs in that it sees the pay-setting process as just another agency problem.  The 
board does not faithfully represent shareholder interests in this model because they are 
beholden to the CEO.  This gives executives substantial influence over the board for all 
of the reasons discussed in Part I.  Managers use their power to get boards to pay them 
more than they would receive if there were an arm’s-length negotiation.  The excess 
payments, or rents, constitute the “additional value managers obtain beyond what would 
be granted by a board that had both the inclination to maximize shareholder value and the 
necessary time and information to perform that task properly.” (p. 62).  
 The difficult problem posed by this claim is how to determine whether such rents 
are being paid.  We can observe actual compensation, but how do we know what amount 
a shareholder value maximizing board would pay?  Bebchuk and Fried finesse this point 
                                                 
12 The managerial power theory is not a new one. In 1932, Berle and Means observed that with the 
diffusion of stock ownership in modern corporations, executives could exercise great power over others’ 
assets. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 4, 6-7, 
passim (1932).   Nor were the implications of managerial power for executive pay unnoticed. Berle and 
Means recognized that the allocation of rents among the firm’s factors of production was affected by the 
separation of ownership and control.  They advocated giving “any surplus which can be made over a 
satisfactory return to the investor” to management in order to provide “an incentive to action.” Berle and 
Means, supra, at 343.    
 While it took other scholars longer to apply managerial power theory to executive 
compensation practices, at least one early version of the theory surfaced in the 1950s. William J. Baumol, 
Business Behavior, Value and Growth (1959) (managerial pay increases with firm size thereby rewarding 
managers for engaging in empire building).   By the 1990s there were a host of articles applying the 
managerial power theory to executive compensation practices.  For example, in the business school 
literature, Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt provide a succinct summary, and empirical verification, of the 
“Managerial Power Model,” focusing on many of the same questions being explored by Bebchuk and 
Fried.  Richard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker, and Keith Weigelt, The Structure of Organizational 
Incentives, 38 Administrative Science Quarterly 438, 441-442 (1993) (defining managerial power as “the 
ability of managers to influence or exert their will or desires on remuneration decisions made by the board 
of directors, or perhaps the compensation committee of the board.”)  
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by claiming that all they need to show is that managers with more power over boards will 
get more pay and that that pay will be in forms that are less performance sensitive.   
They do not maintain, however, that managers will receive all of the firm’s rents.  
Market forces and board monitoring limit deviations from the "arm's length" pay model. 
Other stakeholders also have some impact on the board’s negotiations through what 
Bebchuk and Fried label as “outrage,” which they define as “negative reactions by 
outsiders.” (p. 65).  The costs created from this reaction lead the directors to avoid certain 
compensation packages because strong negative reactions to pay packages can increase 
support for takeovers, attract negative attention to the board, and harm directors’ 
reputations.  
Outsiders will only react adversely to pay packages if they perceive them to be 
outrageous.  If the designers of a compensation scheme can disguise the manager’s rent 
extraction, there will not be substantial opposition to it.  Bebchuk and Fried claim that 
managers indeed camouflage pay packages in order to hide compensation and legitimize 
the amount of managerial rents paid out. (p. 67). 
 Compensation consultants, they claim, often have an important role to play in this 
subterfuge.  First, the consultant develops and recommends the CEO’s pay package, so 
that directors need only approve it.  This protects the directors from judicial challenges as 
they can point to the outside expert’s recommendation as cover for their actions.  Second, 
the compensation consultant is even more vulnerable to pressure from the CEO than the 
directors, because she knows that displeasing the top executive will mean the end of 
further employment by the firm.  This can cut off the consultant’s firm from lucrative 
assignments with the company’s human resource department that pay far more than its 
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much smaller role of advising on the CEO’s pay.  Third, compensation consultants 
respond to this pressure by using their discretion to justify pay arrangements that are 
strongly in the CEO’s favor.  For example, the surveys of comparable CEOs’ pay that are 
given to compensation committees can be tailored to include favorable comparison 
groups so as to justify big pay increases for the firm’s CEO.  Bebchuk and Fried claim 
that these pay surveys have contributed to the steady increase in CEO pay, as each 
company ratchets its CEO’s pay above the average pay level year after year. 
 Turning to the predictions of their managerial power model, Bebchuk and Fried 
focus on the claim that managers with more power will get paid more and have 
compensation packages that are less sensitive to performance.  They argue that CEOs will 
have more power when boards are weak, when there is no large outside shareholder, 
when there are fewer institutional shareholders, and when the company has stronger 
takeover defenses. (p. 80).  In support of their first claim, Bebchuk and Fried offer five 
main groups of studies.  These studies show that CEOs receive more pay and less 
performance sensitive pay when boards: 1) have a greater number of members; 2) have 
more than three of their directors serving on multiple boards; 3) appoint the CEO as 
chairman of the board; 4) have a higher percentage of directors appointed by the CEO; 
and 5) are interlocking.  In a related vein, CEOs are better paid when the CEO appoints 
the head of the compensation committee, or there are insiders on the compensation 
committee.  They are paid less as the level of stock ownership of the directors on the 
compensation committee increases. 
 Bebchuk and Fried next discuss how better shareholder monitoring can reduce 
pay.  Thus, the presence of large (5%+) shareholders is correlated with reduced CEO pay.  
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Similarly, companies with greater institutional shareholder ownership have lower CEO 
pay and more pay for performance, although this impact is affected by the presence of 
business relationships between the institutions and the firm. 
 The authors’ final point is that better protection against hostile takeovers 
correlates with increased executive pay.  Their argument is bolstered by a study showing 
that the adoption of antitakeover defenses is accompanied by CEO pay increases.  In a 
similar manner, CEOs appear to reduce their stockholdings in their firms after the 
passage of antitakeover legislation that applies to the company. 
 In Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine, Bebchuk and Fried seek to illustrate the 
managerial power thesis with examples of particular corporate pay practices.  Chapter 
Seven focuses on severance payments made to departing CEOs which are not 
contractually required by their employment contracts, what they call “gratuitous” 
payments. (p. 87).  They claim that these payments are frequently made when a CEO is 
fired, when the firm is acquired, and when the CEO retires.  For instance, when a board 
terminates the company’s CEO, it may grant the departing executive substantial monetary 
and other benefits which are not called for by the CEO’s contract.  Bebchuk and Fried 
claim that such payments reflect the need to get some directors to acquiesce in the firing, 
or to sweeten their action with a gift.  But in the authors’ view, such payments reflect a 
generosity not seen in arm’s-length bargaining. 
 Post-acquisition payments to departing executives, either by the target or the 
acquirer, are common and frequently far in excess of contractually required payments.  
The authors claim that the best explanation for target-company payments is managerial 
power over the board: the target’s board will only approve the deal if departing 
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management is treated generously, or at least will prefer a deal where managers get 
special treatment.  From the acquirer’s side, it may be willing to make such payments as 
part of a deal to get better terms from target management. Lower acquisition premia are 
correlated with higher payments to departing managers, according to recent research. 
 A similar dynamic exists, Bebchuk and Fried claim, when CEOs retire.  Boards 
agree to large "gratuitous" payments in this situation because of their close personal 
relationships with the CEO, or out of gratitude for what the CEO has done for them.  
Since these payments don’t have to be publicly disclosed, they are camouflaged from 
outsiders and the outrage constraint does not operate.   
 Excessive retirement benefits are the subject of Chapter Eight.  Bebchuk and 
Fried claim that firms have shifted compensation into post-retirement payments and 
benefits because there are very weak disclosure obligations for these forms of 
compensation.  Unlike other forms of pay, which must be disclosed in the summary 
compensation table, the increase in value of an executive's pension plan, or the increase 
in value of a deferred compensation arrangement, is not disclosed in the summary 
compensation table. Bebchuk and Fried claim that this permits boards to "camouflage" 
rent extraction through the use of guaranteed retirement pensions, deferred compensation, 
post-retirement perks, and guaranteed consulting fees.  Each of these four forms of 
payment is unrelated to firm performance. 
Executive pension plans are a form of deferred compensation. They differ from 
other employees’ retirement plans in that they are not tax-qualified.  A Supplemental 
Executive Retirement Plan, (SERP) is a plan designed to equalize "reverse 
discrimination" of retirement programs for executives and highly compensated 
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employees. "Reverse Discrimination" happens as a result of the limits put on qualified 
pension plans such as 401(k) plans and profit sharing plans, so that highly compensated 
employees receive or can deposit a much lower percentage of their pay into these plans. 
Because most executives are paid over the ERISA limit of $200,000, boards cannot use 
tax-advantaged qualified plans, and instead use non-qualified SERPs.   As discussed in 
Scholes et al.,13 the tax efficiency of deferred compensation plans relative to current 
compensation depends on the firm's and manager's current and future tax rates.  Bebchuk 
and Fried show assumptions under which these plans seem tax inefficient in that they 
appear to shift some tax burdens to the employer.14  The fact that firms offer such plans 
only to executives confirms, in Bebchuk and Fried’s eyes, their inefficiency.  
Nevertheless, companies use them, the authors claim, because the SEC’s poor disclosure 
rules do not reveal the enormous size of these promised payments in the summary 
compensation table.    
Post-retirement perks are another sign of managerial power over the pay setting 
process, according to Bebchuk and Fried.  Here, they focus on a variety of different kinds 
of perks, including retired CEOs' use of corporate aircraft for personal reasons.  These 
types of in-kind benefits are a less efficient way of compensating retired executives than 
equivalent cash payments, and are never offered to lower level employees.  The authors 
assert, however, that such benefits have the advantage of not showing up in the firm’s 
disclosures and thus being largely invisible to outsiders. 
                                                 
13  Myron S. Scholes, Mark A. Wolfson, Merle Erickson, Edward L. Maydew, and Terry Shevlin, Taxes 
and Business Strategy : A Planning Approach. (Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004), at 181-183. 
14 If the deferred plan promises a payout linked to a stock index such as the S&P 500, it is generally more 
efficient to let the executive save in this index for himself (because he can achieve a lower tax rate on 
capital gains than the firm can). On the other hand, if the deferred payout  is a fixed annuity, as is more 
common, both the executive and the firm are taxed at ordinary income rates, and the relative efficiency of 
the firm's saving for the executive is determined by the firm's and the executive's relative income tax rates.    
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Consulting contracts are the final post-retirement benefit that Bebchuk and Fried 
point to in support of the managerial power hypothesis.  These contracts pay retired 
CEOs large sums of money for a relatively small amount of, and sometimes no, 
consulting with their replacements.  Again, the authors argue these contracts are nothing 
more than camouflaged severance payments that need not be disclosed by the firm and 
therefore do not risk triggering an adverse reaction from the public or corporate 
stakeholders. 
Chapter Nine discusses the once-widely-used, but now defunct, practice of firms 
extending below-market rate of interest loans to their top executives.  Although this 
practice was outlawed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Bebchuk and Fried believe 
that the former practices provide a “nice illustration of camouflage.”15  Companies 
provided these loans to executives, the authors say, ostensibly to permit them to purchase 
the firms’ stock.  While 40% of these loans actually assisted executives in purchasing 
more of their company’s stock, many others were used for purposes unrelated to the 
executive’s job.   
Bebchuk and Fried argue that these loans were merely disguised and inefficient 
compensation payments.  Their existence was disclosed but the size of the interest rate 
subsidy was difficult to calculate.  Furthermore, many of these loans were later forgiven 
by the company, but the value of this benefit was only disclosed after the forgiveness had 
taken place, usually when the executive left the company, even if there was a prior 
contractual obligation to do so.  Again, the authors claim this minimized any outrage over 
the payment by postponing it until after the executive was gone. 
                                                 
15 P. 112.  Furthermore, $1 billion of loans that were outstanding at the time that Sarbannes-Oxley was 
passed were exempted so the compensation involved continues to be significant at present. Id. 
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 In summary, Part II makes the case that executive pay arrangements are 
influenced by the CEO’s power, rather than being negotiated on an arm’s-length basis.  
Directors try to hide that fact, Bebchuk and Fried claim, by obscuring the amounts of 
compensation being paid.  This obfuscation minimizes any pressure on them to reduce 
pay levels and curb abusive practices.  
 
Part III — Decoupling Pay from Performance 
 
 In Part III, Bebchuk and Fried try to document their claim that executive 
compensation is linked only tenuously to managerial performance, which they see as 
further evidence (and a big cost) of managerial power.  Chapter Ten is focused on non-
equity compensation, such as salary, bonus plans, acquisition bonuses, signing bonuses, 
split-dollar life insurance policies, and severance payments.  The authors argue that each 
one of these forms of compensation is not tied, or is only weakly tied, to performance.  
Bebchuk and Fried see Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which is supposed 
to limit non-performance based pay, as easily circumvented. 
Bebchuk and Fried begin by summarizing research that demonstrates that salary 
and bonus payments did not correlate with managerial performance in the 1990s, and that 
executives are sometimes rewarded for stock-price increases that are unrelated to the 
executive’s own performance. Similarly, in many cases, bonus plans may pay executives 
even for poor performance and give boards substantial discretion to make awards, or to 
lower targets. This is inconsistent, they claim, with tying executive pay to managerial 
performance.   
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 The delinkage of pay and performance is further illustrated, the authors believe, 
by the many “gratuitous” payments made to top executives, such as bonuses for 
acquisitions that are sometimes paid to CEOs at acquiring firms, despite the frequent 
stock-price declines experienced by these firms following the purchase.  If acquisitions 
are value-decreasing events for acquiring firm shareholders, Bebchuk and Fried note, 
why are boards giving CEOs strong incentives to make them?   
The authors also criticize the current form of severance packages for departing 
executives for being too soft on poor performance.  They argue that boards should deny 
large severance payments to CEOs when their firms perform well-below the level of their 
competitors.  Careful contract design could limit this punishment to poor performers and 
still provide sufficient protections for any CEO terminated despite a strong managerial 
showing. 
 Stock options are the subject of the other four chapters in part III.  The main 
argument Bebchuk and Fried make is that while properly designed stock option plans 
should be valuable incentives for managers to produce shareholder value, the plans 
widely used today, “have delivered a considerable amount of pay without 
performance…[and] package the compensation so that it seems defensible and 
legitimate.” (p. 138).  Put slightly differently, they believe that current stock option plans 
deviate from the plans that would be negotiated at arm’s-length, and that those deviations 
systematically favor managers. 
In Chapter Eleven, Bebchuk and Fried argue that stock option plans do not filter 
out windfalls, that is, “substantial gains for managers that are not due to their own 
performance.” (p. 138).  They argue options should be designed to reward only firm-
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specific price movements, not general market conditions.  Indexed options, or other 
similar products, Bebchuk and Fried state, would do a better job than current plans of 
creating incentives for managers at a lower cost, and those savings could be used to 
provide managers with more high powered incentive compensation.   
Few companies use indexed options, however, which the authors claim stems 
from managerial power over the pay setting process.  Managers prefer options that 
reward them for general market price increases because those generate more 
compensation for less effort. Furthermore, indexed options might focus attention on 
poorly-performing CEOs, thus embarrassing them in front of directors and peers.  
Nevertheless, Bebchuk and Fried state, boards can get away with using unindexed 
options because these options enjoy unwarranted legitimacy in the eyes of outsiders. 
In Chapter Twelve, Bebchuk and Fried critique the various justifications offered 
as to why conventional stock options are used instead of indexed options.  One reason for 
the use of these plans is that they are accorded preferential accounting treatment in 
comparison with the indexed or performance-conditioned options the authors advocate.  
Conventional options thereby result in higher reported earnings over their competitors 
and higher reported earnings can enhance share value if the market for the company’s 
stock is not informationally efficient. 
Though conceding this claim might be true, Bebchuk and Fried contend that it 
does not lead to the conclusion that the lack of indexed options is the result of arm’s-
length contracting.  First of all, even if there would be a short-term share price drop from 
adopting indexed options, there could be substantial offsetting benefits as executives’ 
incentives are sharpened.  Second, Bebchuk and Fried assert that institutional investors 
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favor indexed options despite their potential adverse impact on reported earnings, which 
suggests to the authors that shareholders are not concerned about the accounting effect.  
Third, in the past few years many firms have begun to voluntarily expense options, yet 
they continue to use conventional options, suggesting that the accounting rationale is not 
the real reason they have not adopted indexed options.  Finally, many managers have 
lobbied to stop the FASB from requiring firms to expense conventional options. The 
authors claim that managers want to stop FASB because expensing would make the size 
of their option payments more salient and would eliminate their justification for not 
switching to indexed options.  Bebchuk and Fried find it unsurprising that these same 
executives have not tried to convince the FASB to change the accounting treatment for 
indexed options to level the playing field. 
 The remaining chapters in Part III of Pay Without Performance discuss various 
aspects of equity-based compensation that Bebchuk and Fried feel further demonstrate 
managerial power over the pay setting process: the widespread use of at-the-money 
options, option repricing, reload options, restricted stock in lieu of options, and 
executives’ ability to unwind their equity positions.  Beginning with at-the-money 
options, the authors observe that they are used by virtually every public company in the 
U.S., even though out-of-the-money options “generate much higher pay for performance 
sensitivity per dollar of expected value…[and] empirical evidence suggests that giving 
managers out-of-the-money options rather than at-the-money options does, on average, 
boost firm value.” (p. 161).  According to Bebchuk and Fried, this pattern would not be 
observed in an arm’s-length setting, but rather only exists because at-the-money options 
give managers the greatest amount of “rents” without creating much “outrage.”  
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Moreover, managers can manipulate the timing of corporate disclosures and option grants 
to increase the options’ value.   
 Repricing of stock options is another area where managers use their power over 
boards to get more for themselves, say the authors.  Repricings occur when firms either 
drop the exercise price for existing options, or alternatively issue new options at a lower 
exercise price to replace existing ones.  Although proponents frequently maintain that 
such changes are needed to retain existing managers, or to protect option holders from 
adverse stock price movements unrelated to managerial performance, Bebchuk and Fried 
assert that neither justification holds up well under scrutiny.  They find the managerial 
power explanation a more logical one – managers want conventional options that get 
repriced when stock prices fall, rather than indexed options, because the former generate 
bigger gains for them.  The superficially plausible justifications of improved retention 
and protection from unrelated adverse stock-price movements serve to minimize any 
dissent by outsiders. 
 Bebchuk and Fried offer a related critique of reload options.  Reload options 
permit executives to lock in the benefits from increases in their company’s stock price 
even when the long-term returns of holding the firm’s stock are flat.  Proponents of these 
options claim they encourage early exercise of options and greater stock holdings by 
executives.  The authors say this is just a pretext for paying executives more money 
because nothing prevents executives from selling the additional shares they get when they 
exercise these options and that managers, in fact, do just that.  Bebchuk and Fried assert 
that firms could increase managers’ stock ownership much more cheaply by simply 
requiring them to hold those shares they get from exercising options. 
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 Chapter Thirteen concludes with a strong critique of the current movement toward 
replacing conventional stock options with restricted stock.  Bebchuk and Fried believe 
this amounts to replacing an at-the-money option with a zero-price option, increasing 
executive windfalls even when the stock price falls below its grant-date price. (p. 171).  
They are unpersuaded by claims that restricted stock is particularly valuable because it 
requires executives to hold shares longer, since that holding requirement could be easily 
included in a conventional option plan.  They also believe restricted stock is an expensive 
method of preserving managerial incentives (in comparison to indexed options) in the 
face of declining stock prices. 
 The concluding chapter in Part III analyzes executives’ freedom to sell their 
company stock and options.  Bebchuk and Fried state that managers have almost 
unfettered discretion to sell their vested stock and options, which weakens their 
incentives to maximize shareholder value or provides them a windfall if firms try to 
maintain these incentives by granting additional equity.   Even with respect to unvested 
stock and options, the authors assert that executives “are generally allowed to hedge away 
their equity exposure before these instruments vest.” (p. 177).  While managers benefit 
greatly from this freedom, Bebchuk and Fried believe that firms should, in many 
instances, prohibit managers from selling their shares and options so as to preserve their 
beneficial incentive effects. 
 A second aspect of this problem, the authors argue, is that managers have almost 
total control over when they unload their stock and options.  This freedom gives 
managers the opportunity to engage in insider trading through their informational 
advantage over outsiders.  Although many companies have insider-trading policies that 
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limit when executives can trade their shares, Bebchuk and Fried claim, “these trading 
windows and blackout periods have not been designed to effectively prevent managers 
from trading profitably on their inside information.” (p. 181).  This pattern is consistent, 
in the authors’ eyes, with the managerial power hypothesis because insider trading 
benefits executives in a way outsiders are unlikely to notice.  They do acknowledge that 
the improved disclosure rules of Sarbanes-Oxley will reduce the profitability of this form 
of insider trading, but claim that the historical practice still supports their overall view of 
executive pay practices as skewed sharply in managers’ favor.  Since firms could prohibit 
all such abuses by contract, the authors argue, this is another illustration of the perverse 
effects of managerial power.  Finally, Bebchuk and Fried note that executives’ freedom 
to unwind their equity positions with the company could give them incentives to 
manipulate their company’s stock price to maximize the short-term value of their 
holdings.   
 In short, Part III of Pay Without Performance makes the case that equity-based 
compensation in its current form is too costly and often fails to generate the proper 
incentives to maximize shareholder value – both because of the decoupling of pay and 
performance, and because of the creation of perverse incentives to misreport results, to 
suppress bad news, and to choose projects that are not transparent. 
 
Part IV – Policy Implications 
 
 The concluding section of Pay Without Performance focuses on the policy 
implications of Bebchuk and Fried’s analysis. They divide their recommendations into 
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two chapters: Chapter Fifteen proposes changes to current executive-compensation 
arrangements and Chapter Sixteen broadens the inquiry to cover the relationship between 
shareholders and boards.  The former chapter is partly a summary of proposals sprinkled 
throughout the earlier parts of the book: institutional investors should push firms: (1) to 
index options, (2) to eliminate restricted stock grants and generous severance packages 
that are not tied to managers’ performance, and (3) to limit managers’ freedom to unload 
equity incentives.  There are also several other policy interventions, however, brought 
forward for the first time. 
 Increased transparency in executive pay disclosures would, in Bebchuk and 
Fried’s view, help outsiders understand corporate executives’ compensation 
arrangements and thereby check the use of their less-desirable elements.  The authors 
propose four mandatory rules: option expensing, monetary valuation of all forms of 
compensation, disclosure on how market movements affect option values recognized by 
executives, and restrictions on managers’ sale of options and stock.  In each case, the 
authors stress that adopting the rule would make it easier for shareholders and other 
outsiders to determine the size of executive pay packages or the effect of managers’ 
performance on their pay. 
 Compensation committee practices are very briefly considered as a second, albeit 
limited, source for improving the executive pay system.  The authors believe that while 
current practices can be improved, these changes can only address carelessness and 
insufficient attention, which are not the main problems today.        
 The final proposal Bebchuk and Fried make in Chapter Fifteen is to require 
shareholder approval of equity-based plans and of specific “suspect” compensation 
 28
arrangements. NYSE and NASDAQ rule changes in 2003 required listed companies to 
put option plans up for a shareholder vote, thereby implementing the first of these two 
ideas.  Shareholder approval of “suspect” practices, such as option repricing, has been 
proposed by some institutional investors, but has yet to be mandated. In both instances, 
the authors acknowledge that these changes will have only a limited effect on executive 
pay. 
Yet, in the end, Bebchuk and Fried conclude that none of these changes is likely 
to fix the system.  Rather, executive compensation problems arise because, under current 
arrangements, boards cannot be relied upon to effectively scrutinize and monitor the 
decisions and activities of their CEOs.  They see Sarbanes-Oxley’s emphasis on director 
independence and paying directors with stock as steps in the right direction, but ones that 
can never provide sufficient affirmative incentives for directors to maximize shareholder 
value. They hold out more hope for the SEC’s proposal to permit shareholders to 
nominate candidates for the board in limited circumstances, although they say it does not 
go far enough (p. 208-210). 
Instead, Bebchuk and Fried argue that recent corporate governance reforms need 
to be augmented by making directors directly accountable to shareholders.  They believe 
that only by reducing takeover defenses, giving shareholders more power to change 
corporate rules, and opening up the nomination process to facilitate direct shareholder 
nomination of whole slates of directors, will the fundamental problems of the executive 
pay system be cured.  In their view, none of the problems identified by defenders of the 
current nomination system – distraction of corporate management, increased influence 
for special interests such as labor unions, shareholder myopia, and paternalistic protection 
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of shareholders from themselves – justify maintaining the current system with all of its 
flaws.  In short, Bebchuk and Fried conclude that directors’ insulation from shareholders 
is the root of all of the problems in executive compensation. 
 
II.  The Existence of Managerial Power Does Not Imply That Contracts are 
Suboptimal 
 
 Bebchuk and Fried’s central claim is that the “managerial power” perspective 
explains executive pay arrangements better than what they term the "official story" or 
“arms-length contracting,” which they describe as: 
the official “view” of executive compensation – that boards, bargaining at arms-
length with CEOs, negotiate pay arrangements designed to serve shareholder 
interests (p. 15). 
 
The main problem with this claim is that in no sense is “arm’s length contracting” an 
official view among scholars. “Arm’s length contracting” amounts to a standard of 
theoretical perfection, and such a contract would only exist in a perfect world without 
frictions such as contracting costs and transactions costs. As such, it is not a relevant 
benchmark.  Saying that there is something wrong with a contract because it is not "arm's 
length" is akin to saying that there is something wrong with a tank that does not perform 
well on a racetrack (where there are small frictions) because it has been designed to 
operate in the desert (where there are large frictions).   
 As recognized and discussed by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003), what a large body of mainstream scholars espouse instead, and what 
may be fairly termed an "official view," is “optimal contracting” theory, which posits that 
 30
contracts are designed to maximize shareholder value net of contracting costs and 
transactions costs This is a reasonable alternative hypothesis with which to compare the 
predictions of "managerial power theory." As we show below, in many settings where 
“managerial power” exists, observed contracts anticipate and try to minimize the costs of 
this power, and therefore may in fact be written optimally. As a result, the optimal 
contracting and managerial power perspectives are not competing explanations. It is true 
that contract structures reflect CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get more 
pay, but this fact does not mean that CEO pay is not optimized for shareholders, nor does 
it imply that CEO pay needs reform.  The first step is to define optimal contracts, 
managerial power, and related terms. 
 
II.A. What is an optimal contract? 
 
 In this review, and similar to Bebchuk and Fried, we use the terms “optimal 
contracts” and “efficient contracts” as synonyms. We follow Core, Guay, and Larcker, 
and define an “optimal contract” or “efficient contract” as “one that maximizes the net 
expected economic value to shareholders after transactions costs (e.g., contracting costs) 
and payments to employees.  An equivalent way of saying this is that … contracts 
minimize agency costs.” 16 Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker similarly define an “optimal 
contract” as “one that minimizes agency costs (that is, the sum of contracting costs, 
monitoring costs, other costs in achieving compliance with the principal’s interest) and 
                                                 
16 John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, and David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A 
Survey, 9 Economic Policy Review - Federal Reserve Bank of New York 27 (2003) at page 27. 
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the costs of residual divergence.”17 In contrast, in this book, Bebchuk and Fried use the 
term "arms-length contracting" with the suggestion that if a contract is not the product of 
"arms-length bargaining," it is not efficient and not optimal. These definitions highlight 
the key role contracting costs play in determining what governance systems are optimal.   
 The use of the word "optimal," while standard in the literature, can cause 
confusion. Optimal does not mean perfect, but the best contract that can be achieved to 
maximize shareholder value given the contracting costs in a given situation. This 
perspective is well-summarized by Jensen and Meckling: 
Finding that agency costs are non-zero (i.e., that there are costs associated with 
the separation of ownership and control in the corporation) and concluding 
therefrom that the agency relationship is non-optimal, wasteful or inefficient is 
equivalent in every sense to comparing a world in which iron ore is a scarce 
commodity (and therefore costly) to a world in which it is freely available at zero 
resource cost, and concluding that the first world is “non-optimal” - a perfect 
example of the fallacy criticized by Coase and what Demsetz characterizes as the 
“Nirvana” form of analysis.18
  
Consistent with this view, when we argue below that many contracts with 
managers may in fact be optimal, we are not claiming that U.S. corporate governance is 
perfect, or as economists sometimes say, "first best efficient." Nor are we claiming that 
contracts meet Bebchuk and Fried's standard of "arm's length contracting." What we 
mean is that U.S. corporate governance may in fact be extremely good given the 
existence of information costs, transactions costs, and the existing U.S. legal and 
regulatory system.  Conceivably, improved regulation or other changes to the contracting 
environment could lower contracting costs and improve overall governance by, for 
example, making boards more independent and effective monitors. This is an important 
                                                 
17 Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 762.   
18 Michael C. Jensen and William H Meckling, Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 3 Journal of 
Financial Economics 328 (1976) 
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point, to which we will return when we discuss in Section IV how any changes to macro-
level governance features (such as a regulation that all directors must be independent) 
must consider the costs of these changes (such as the fact that there is a limited pool of 
well-qualified independent directors) as well as the benefits. For this Sub-Section and 
next two Sub-Sections, however, we hold the existing U.S. contracting environment fixed 
and address the question of whether compensation structures are written optimally within 
our current system. This means that, for the moment, we address optimality at the firm 
level, not at the overall domestic or global economy level. In Sub-Section II.D, we turn to 
the question of optimality at the global economy level.  
 As an example of the importance of contracting costs, consider the differences in 
contracting in the U.S. and in Italy.19 As discussed by Shleifer and Vishny,20 and by 
Bebchuk in other work,21 Italy’s weaker legal system makes it easier for insiders to 
“expropriate” or steal from outside shareholders. This systemic weakness increases 
contracting costs in Italy. These greater costs result from the fact that the contract needs 
to be written to prevent expropriation, because the legal system does not. As a 
consequence of these higher contracting costs, optimal ownership structures in Italy leave 
much more control in the hands of insiders than do those in the U.S.  Greater insider 
ownership forces Italian managers to internalize the costs of their private benefits. An 
interpretation of the greater agency costs stemming from this weak legal system is that 
                                                 
19 This is an example of the general phenomenon that weaker legal and political systems are associated with 
higher contracting costs and different contracting outcomes. See, for example, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. 
Fin. 1131 (1997). When contracting costs are high, the type of contracts that will be used are different; 
moreover, high contracting costs mean that the optimal contract will permit higher agency costs, and higher 
agency costs mean that less net value is given to outside shareholders.   
20 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737, 742 (1997). 
21 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control, NBER Working 
Paper 7203 (1999), at 3 and 24.  
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the Italian contracting environment is less efficient than the U.S. contracting 
environment.  Because outside shareholders in Italy fear expropriation, they are less 
willing to provide capital, and the Italian stock market is much smaller on a per capita 
basis than the U.S. stock market.   
 The assumption that the Italian contracting environment is less efficient than the 
U.S. system, however, does not imply that Italian firms are writing suboptimal contracts 
or that managers in Italy are extracting unexpected private benefits.  Italian firms may be 
contracting optimally given the high costs imposed by their suboptimal legal system. If 
the Italian legal system could be improved at low cost, or if an Italian company could 
move to the U.S. at low cost, shareholder wealth would go up because contracting costs 
go down. The fact that neither of these adjustments have occurred (at least for most 
Italian firms) suggests that the adjustments are very costly, and the persistence of these 
costs does not imply that Italian firms are operating or contracting inefficiently within 
their environment. 
 
II.B. A contract does not need to be “arm’s-length” to be optimal.  
 
 Although Bebchuk and Fried suggest that if a contract is not an “arm’s-length 
contract,” then it is not an “optimal contract,” this inference is not correct.22 By “arm’s-
length contract,” the authors mean a contract that is written by a completely independent 
board (or equivalently a board that is completely dependent on shareholder interests). An 
independent board, however, is not necessary for an optimal contract. 
                                                 
22 For an example of this suggestion, see p. 20 under the heading "Efficient Contracting and Paying for 
Performance" where Bebchuk and Fried suggest that a contract not consistent with the "arm's length model 
is "inefficient" or not "optimal."  
 34
 As Bebchuk and Fried note, in most cases, a corporate board is not completely 
independent of the CEO (e.g., internally promoted CEOs will know the board members, 
and even externally hired CEOs are likely to know at least some of the board members). 
It may be too costly and therefore not optimal for the board to be completely independent 
because the board has many other responsibilities besides contracting with executives 
about compensation, and to best fulfill these responsibilities often necessitates a non-
independent board.23 For example, the board provides input into project selection and 
investments. A board that is optimized for project selection and investment decisions may 
contain insiders and thus not be independent of the CEO. Fama and Jensen make this 
point by noting that since the board is to be comprised of experts, it is natural that the 
most influential members are internal managers with valuable firm-specific information 
about the organization.24  A board that is optimized for making compensation decisions 
could destroy value by making bad decisions on more crucial items.25 Thus, the board 
structure that maximizes overall share value may not be comprised entirely of 
independent directors. In this case, the optimal compensation contract with the CEO is 
not the one that results from the arm’s-length bargaining of an independent board: it is 
the one that maximizes net shareholder value given that the board is optimized to perform 
several functions.  
                                                 
23 In the extreme, "independence" of directors could be enhanced by requiring that directors serve only one 
one-year term at a given firm, and at the end of the year the entire board would be replaced.  While this 
would make it very difficult for the CEO to gain power over and compromise the independence of 
directors, it would likely come at a very high cost. 
24 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. Fin. Econ. 301, 314 
(1983). 
25 For a discussion of the idea that the board is structured to optimize competing objectives, see Benjamin 
E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A 
Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 Economic Policy Review - Federal Reserve Bank of New York 7 
(2003). 
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Just as in our Italian example, a contract can maximize net shareholder value, 
even in the absence of “arm’s-length contracting,” given market and legal constraints. 
One cannot determine whether a compensation contract is optimal by examining the 
contracting environment in isolation. It is also necessary to consider whether the board of 
directors has been optimized over parameters beyond independence from the manager. 
The key point Bebchuk and Fried ignore is that an optimal board structure minimizes 
overall agency costs, not just the cost of compensating managers. 
 
II.C. The existence of managerial power does not show that contracts are suboptimal.  
 
 Bebchuk and Fried introduce and describe the “managerial power” perspective as 
follows:  
After analyzing the shortcomings of the arm’s-length contracting view, we turn 
… to the managerial power perspective on executive compensation. The same 
factors that limit the usefulness of the arm’s-length model suggest that executives 
have had substantial influence over their own pay. Compensation arrangements 
have often deviated from arm’s-length contracting because directors have been 
influenced by management, sympathetic to directors, insufficiently motivated to 
bargain over compensation, or simply ineffectual in overseeing compensation. 
Executives’ influence over directors has enabled them to obtain “rents” – benefits 
greater than those obtainable under true arm’s-length bargaining. (pp. 4-5) 
(emphasis added) 
 
In short, they view “managerial power” as equivalent to contracting that deviates from 
arms-length bargaining, and therefore imply that managerial power necessarily results in 
suboptimal contracting and excess pay. In the prior Section, we explained why the lack of 
an independent board and the resulting managerial power does not imply suboptimal 
contracting. In this Section, we further argue that just because a CEO attains managerial 
power does not imply that the CEO receives excess pay.  
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In many contracting settings, managerial power is unavoidable. Before hiring a 
manager, the shareholders and board know that a successful executive will grow 
powerful and exert more influence on the board over time (indeed, it may well be optimal 
to yield power and discretion over time to talented managers that demonstrate a valuable 
understanding of the firm’s business environment).26 Ex post growth in managerial 
power, however, says nothing about whether contracting with this manager is suboptimal, 
ex ante. That is, when a new CEO is hired, optimal contracts are expected to be 
structured ex ante to take into consideration that the CEO will ex post build managerial 
power over time. Such contracts will ensure that, in expectation, the CEO does not earn 
excess pay.27 For example, shareholders may place limits on shares reserved for stock 
options and restricted stock grants, place limits on the magnitude and form of perquisite 
consumption, or carefully structure board-selection rules or shareholder-approval rules to 
slow the growth in managerial power. The key point here is that simply showing, at a 
given point in time, that a manager has power says little about whether a firm has 
contracted optimally with the manager, or whether the manager earns excess pay in 
expectation over his or her tenure as manager. To show that the power is suboptimal, one 
must take the further step to show that it leads to bad outcomes for shareholders. 
 Returning to our example of Italy, their weak legal system makes it impossible ex 
post to stop insiders from gaining power and using this power to expropriate wealth from 
                                                 
26 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their 
Monitoring of the CEO, 88 Am. Econ. Review 96 (1998).  
27 As noted in the previous section, the manager may already have power at the time of his initial 
employment. This initial power will allow the manager to earn pay greater than he could with arms’ length 
bargaining. An optimal contract in this setting will minimize the cost of this power and the costs of 
anticipated growth in power over time.  Thus it will take into account the fact that the initial contract will 
have a limited life of say three to five years.  See Stewart J. Schwab and Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical 
Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, Unpublished Working 
Paper (October 21, 2004) (documenting length of CEO employment contracts and finding that the most 
common lengths are 3 and 5 years). 
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outside shareholders. But this need not stop Italian firms from writing ex ante optimal 
contracts with insiders that anticipate expropriation and minimize its expected cost. 
Under the assumption that the residual agency problems and deadweight losses from the 
contracting process are greater in Italy than in the U.S., contracting and governance are 
more efficient in the U.S. The existence of larger residual agency problems and 
managerial power in Italy, however, does not imply that Italian managers receive greater 
excess pay than U.S. managers. Assuming shareholders in Italian firms recognize these 
greater agency costs, they will structure contracts optimally to constrain excess pay. Of 
course, some firms may contract suboptimally with managers, and for these firms, agency 
costs will not be minimized and managers will receive excess pay. But the critical point is 
that the existence of large residual agency problems does not imply that contracts are 
suboptimal; equivalently, there can be large residual agency problems and substantial 
managerial power in settings where there is no excess pay.  
 
II.D. How does one distinguish between costly contracting and suboptimal 
contracting?  
 
 If one wishes to claim that regulation is necessary because the U.S. governance 
system is suboptimal, as do Bebchuk and Fried, it is important to be able to distinguish 
between: (1) contracts that are optimal in the presence of contracting costs and (2) 
suboptimal contracts. Because managerial power will be greater in both cases, it is 
important to define appropriate benchmarks to establish whether observed managerial 
power is evidence of suboptimal contracting or not. One benchmark we have discussed is 
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governance systems in other countries. If a governance system is less efficient in one 
country than another, then economic indicators such as market valuation and productivity 
are expected to be lower in the country with less efficient governance.  
Holmstrom and Kaplan use stock returns and productivity growth as a benchmark 
to evaluate U.S. governance and executive pay, and conclude that U.S. shareholders 
should be very pleased about corporate performance over the recent decade.28 There is no 
evidence from stock returns (which is the performance measure shareholders care about) 
that U.S. corporate governance in general, or U.S. executive pay in particular, has 
substantially declined in competitiveness relative to other countries over the last two 
decades. As Holmstrom and Kaplan emphasize: 
Although the U.S. stock market has had negative returns over the last several 
years, it has performed well relative to other stock markets, both recently and in 
the longer term. In fact, the U.S. stock market has generated returns as least as 
high as those of the European and Pacific markets during each of the five time 
periods considered--since 2001, since 1997, since 1992, since 1987, and since 
1982 … Stock returns reflect publicly available information about executive 
compensation. Returns, therefore, are measured net of executive compensation 
payments. The fact that shareholders of U.S. companies earned higher returns 
even after payments to management does not support the claim that the U.S. 
executive pay system is designed inefficiently; if anything, shareholders appear 
better off with the U.S. system of executive pay than with the systems that prevail 
in other countries.29
 
So, when other countries are used as the benchmark, there is no evidence that contracting 
costs have increased in the U.S., that U.S. executives as a group have taken advantage of 
suboptimal contracts, or that they have extracted rents through excess compensation.  
 Another approach to assess whether individual executives are earning excess pay 
is to use within-country (as well as within-industry, within-firm-size, etc.) average 
                                                 
28 Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and 
What's Wrong? ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003 (September 2003).  
29 Id. at 2-3. 
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compensation as a benchmark. The idea here is that a subset of firms contract more or 
less optimally than the average firm, and one can estimate the magnitude of rents 
accruing to managers, and the governance characteristics of firms where these rents 
appear large. Note that this is an attempt to focus on variation in the optimality of 
contracts as opposed to variation in contracting costs. If contracting is costly, residual 
agency problems will be large and managers are expected to gain power over time. If this 
ex post situation is considered in the ex ante structuring of contracts, one does not expect 
the manager to reap rents through excess compensation over their tenure. If some 
contracts are written suboptimally, however, some managers will reap rents through 
excess compensation. It is not sufficient to show that a governance feature is associated 
with excess pay, unless one can also show that this compensation is the product of 
suboptimal governance. Showing suboptimal governance can be accomplished by 
observing whether firms with higher excess compensation show worse performance, as is 
shown by Core, Holthausen, and Larcker for a sample of U.S. firms in the 1980s.30 This 
cross-firm approach is designed to identify bad apples within an economy. It does not tell 
us, however, whether a given economy suffers from systematic governance problems as 
does the cross-country approach discussed above.    
 In contrast to these approaches that compare markets and market outcomes, 
Bebchuk and Fried argue that pay structures must be measured by the standard of arm's 
length bargaining:  
The absence of arms-length bargaining could still mean that managers are paid 
too much or paid in inefficient ways. In such a market, compensation levels could 
be higher than those that would prevail if arms-length bargaining shaped the 
                                                 
30 John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker, Corporate Governance, CEO Compensation, 
and Firm Performance, 51 J. Fin. Econ. 371 (1999). 
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market. Thus, when the market as a whole is distorted by the absence of arms-
length bargaining, general conformity to market terms cannot allay concerns 
about the amount and structure of compensation.  
 
In the end, then, the validity of the arguments for deference to market outcomes 
depend on whether those outcomes are largely generated by arms-length 
negotiations between executives and self-interested purchasers of their services. 
(p. 22).   
 
Essentially, they maintain that unless U.S. CEO compensation is the product of arms’ 
length bargaining, it is suboptimal.   
As we have discussed above, there are three problems with this conclusion.  First, 
it is not necessary for a contract to be the product of arm's length negotiations for it to be 
optimal. Requiring a contract to be arm's length amounts to using a standard of 
theoretical perfection as the benchmark, or to requiring that the world be perfect or first-
best efficient. In the eyes of Jensen and Meckling, this could be viewed as a complaint 
that Nirvana does not exist.31 A second problem is that there is no empirical evidence to 
suggest that the U.S. contracting environment (as it is) is not as good as any in the world.  
Third, it seems dangerous to regulate behavior according to a standard of theoretical 
perfection, especially when one cannot demonstrate that the current system is not 
working well.  If arm's length contracts do not exist in the U.S., they seem unlikely to 
exist elsewhere in the world.  If we force firms to a standard of arm's length contracting, 
how do we know if the benefits of achieving this standard will be less than the costs?  
 
III. U.S. CEOs Have Substantial Performance Incentives 
 
                                                 
31 Jensen and Meckling, supra note 18. 
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 We next examine Bebchuk and Fried’s second major claim: that U.S. CEO 
compensation is inefficient “pay without performance.”  If “pay without performance” in 
fact exists, it would provide evidence that contracts are suboptimal.  In this section, we 
show that U.S. compensation in fact exhibits much pay for performance, and that the 
authors’ claims stem from not giving sufficient weight to important sources of incentives 
in U.S. CEO’s compensation contracts. Specifically, they focus exclusively on the 
performance component of annual pay (including grants of options), and fail to consider 
the vastly stronger incentives provided by CEOs’ equity portfolios.32  
 Bebchuk and Fried offer four main and interrelated critiques of U.S. pay 
practices: (1) executive pay is too high; (2) CEO contracts do not provide enough 
incentives (there is too little pay for performance); (3) options and other equity-based pay 
provide “windfalls” in the sense that they increase in value when the stock price 
increases, due to market-wide factors, rather than managerial performance; and (4) CEOs 
have too much freedom to unwind their incentives. As we will make clear below, these 
critiques are interrelated in the sense that for a given level of pay, if incentives are too 
low, then pay is too high.  
As Bebchuk and Fried recognize, there are benefits and costs to imposing 
incentives (pp. 19-20). The optimal contract imposes the precise amount of incentives 
that maximizes net benefits. The benefits of incentives are that they encourage the CEO 
to make the right choices. The costs of these incentives are that the CEO must be paid for 
                                                 
32 For instance, Bebchuk and Fried devote Chapters 11 to 14 to what they consider to be shortcomings of 
what can be broadly termed grants of options and stock (e.g., that because these securities contain a 
"windfall" component they give CEOs an unnecessarily large compensation grant).  However, they do not 
balance this critique of equity grants with a discussion of the incentive benefits that occur when CEOs hold 
large portfolios of stock and options (where this portfolio comes from the accumulation of past grants of 
unexercised options and unsold investments in firm stock). 
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his work, and because he is risk-averse, he will demand more compensation as the 
amount of incentives imposed is increased.  If the CEO’s contract imposes too many 
incentives and offers too little pay, the CEO will quit and work elsewhere. Conversely, if 
the contract offers too much pay and imposes too little incentives, pay could be cut or 
incentives could be increased or both. This is the essence of the authors’ call for 
“windfalls” to be removed from options: Their assumption is that by not removing the 
market component of options, pay is too high, and that reducing the “windfall” market 
component could reduce pay without causing the executive to quit. 
 
III.A There are two equivalent ways of providing incentives  
 
 In this Section, we show there are two ways of providing incentives: (1) by 
making managers’ pay vary with performance, and (2) requiring managers to hold stock 
and options that vary with performance. We will show that these two methods can 
provide identical incentives, even though the observed pay is different.   
 Suppose that a firm is contracting optimally, and that the firm wants to provide 
incentives based on market-adjusted stock returns (the market-adjusted return is the 
difference between the return on the firm’s stock return and the market return).  Assume 
that the expected return on the firm’s stock is the same as the expected return on the 
market. Suppose further that the CEO has outside wealth of $20 million. Also, assume 
that the optimal amount of incentives for this CEO requires that the CEO’s wealth 
increases (decreases) by $100,000 for every percentage point that the firm’s stock return 
outperforms (underperforms) the market return.  For example, if the firm's stock return is 
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5% and the market return is 10%, the contract requires that the CEO's wealth decrease by 
$500,000. This optimal contract only rewards the CEO when firm performance exceeds 
market performance, and thus is consistent with Bebchuk and Fried's call for incentives 
based on peer-adjusted performance. Finally, assume that this CEO requires $2 million in 
annual compensation for him to agree to this contract.  
Consider two different contracts to achieve these incentive requirements, “Pay 
Incentives” and “Portfolio Incentives”.  The first contract, “Pay Incentives”, is a contract 
that consists of a salary of $2 million and a bonus that is equal to the product of $10 
million and the firm's market-adjusted return. This bonus meets the requirement that the 
CEO's wealth changes by $100,000 for each 1% deviation between the stock return and 
the market return (i.e., $10 million x 1% = $100,000). Note that the expected bonus is $0 
(because the expected return on the firm’s stock is the same as the expected return on the 
market). Let us further assume, in the spirit of Bebchuk and Fried's call for incentives 
based on peer-adjusted performance, that if the firm’s stock return is less than the market 
return (that is, the market-adjusted return is negative), the bonus is negative. For 
example, as shown in Table One, if the market-adjusted return is -50%, the CEO would 
have to pay the firm $5,000,000. The CEO’s expected pay from this contract is $2 million 
(= $2 million salary + an expected bonus of $0).  
The second contract, “Portfolio Incentives”, requires the CEO to use half of his 
outside wealth to purchase $10 million in stock and pays the CEO a salary of $2 million, 
but does not have a bonus plan. Because this contract requires the CEO to purchase $10 
million in firm stock while selling $10 million in the market portfolio, it effectively 
creates a security that has a payoff of $100,000 for each 1% deviation between the firm 
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return and the market return (i.e., $10 million times the market indexed return). Again, 
under the assumption that the expected returns are the same for the firm and the market, 
the expected pay from this plan is $2 million (= $2 million salary). 
 Table One shows that these two contracts provide identical incentives as 
measured by the change in CEO wealth for each 1% difference between the return on the 
firm’s stock return and the market return. The table displays payments and CEO wealth 
changes associated with these contracts in three scenarios: a firm stock return of -50%, 
0%, and 50%.  To make the example more straightforward, we assume that the market 
return for the year was 0%, and so the market-adjusted returns are -50%, 0%, and 50%. 
The “Pay Incentives” contract shown in the upper panel delivers these wealth changes 
through a bonus, and the “Portfolio Incentives” contract shown in the lower panel 
delivers these wealth changes through changes in stock value. As illustrated in Table 
One, the two contracts deliver identical CEO total wealth changes.33  The “Pay 
Incentives” contract and the “Portfolio Incentives” contract result in identical risk 
exposures and therefore identical incentives.34  
                                                 
33 This occurs because these two contracts provide identical exposure to the market-adjusted return. In the 
“Portfolio Incentives” contract, the manager’s exposure consists of his $10 million market portfolio and his 
$10 million stock portfolio. To see that the exposure in the “Pay Incentives” contract is identical, note that 
the bonus is equal to the product of $10 million and the firm's market-adjusted return. This bonus is 
equivalent to simultaneously holding $10 million in firm stock and a $10 million short position in the 
market portfolio, which gives a payout of $10 million times the firm return minus $10 million times the 
market return, or $10 million times the market-adjusted return. Thus, the manager’s overall exposure is 
implicitly equivalent to a net $10 million exposure to the market return (the manager's $20 million market 
portfolio less the $10 million short position embedded in the bonus) plus a $10 million exposure to the 
firm's return. This is the same as the “Portfolio Incentives” contract, in which the manager’s exposure 
explicitly consists of his $10 million market portfolio and his $10 million stock portfolio.   
34 Although the incentives provided are the same, assuming that both firm and the CEO observe the terms 
of the contract, the "Pay Incentives" contract requires an ex post commitment and therefore is more 
difficult to enforce. It requires the ability of both the firm and executive to commit to making cash transfers 
in the future when the price changes. The executive can be tempted to renege after large price declines 
(when he would owe a large bonus to the firm), and the firm can be tempted to renege after large price run-
ups (when it would owe a large bonus to the manager). Because the "Portfolio Incentives" is fulfilled once 
the manager purchases the stock, it is simple to enforce: the executives directly benefits from (is punished 
by) any stock price increases (decreases).  These contracting enforcement difficulties may account for why 
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In spite of identical compensation and incentives, the observed payment stream 
from the two plans is quite different. Under “Pay Incentives”, the CEO’s bonus will cause 
pay to vary with firm performance. Under “Portfolio Incentives”, the CEO will be paid 
$2 million no matter how bad or good firm performance is. If a shareholder did not see 
the CEO’s stock ownership in the proxy statement, he might conclude that the CEO had 
no pay-performance incentives.  If the firm’s market-adjusted return fell by 50%, 
however, the CEO’s wealth would be lower by $5 million, the same as in “Pay 
Incentives”, which would require the CEO to pay the firm $5 million.  “Pay Incentives”, 
though, would show highly variable total CEO pay, and a naïve analysis might conclude 
that pay-performance incentives for “Pay Incentives” were much greater than “Portfolio 
Incentives,” even though they are identical. 
 
III.B Most U.S. CEOs’ incentives are provided by their stock and option portfolios 
 
 U.S. executive incentives are designed much more like “Portfolio Incentives” than 
“Pay Incentives.” In other words, pay-for-performance is provided primarily though 
executive stock and option holdings. This fact has been established in the literature at 
least since Jensen and Murphy’s study in 1990.35 Bebchuk and Fried do not consider this 
point and assert that U.S. executive incentives should follow “Pay Incentives,” which 
predicts much variation in flow pay when performance varies. This perspective ignores 
the fact, however, that executives’ stock and option portfolios are the primary source of 
                                                                                                                                                 
most CEO contracts (at least in the U.S.) are more consistent with the “Portfolio Incentives” contract than 
the “Pay Incentives” contract. We discuss the evidence to support this claim below. 
35 Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J.Pol. Econ. 
225 (1990). 
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incentives.  Hall and Liebman summarize this common misperception in the abstract to 
their 1998 paper: 
A common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and 
CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest, publicly 
traded U.S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm 
performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost 
entirely by the changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and options.36   
 
Thus, the fact that CEO pay does not vary much with performance does not mean that 
CEOs have no incentives or that CEO pay is inappropriate. Rather, equity portfolios, 
which are structured similarly to our “Portfolio Incentives” example, provide U.S. CEOs 
with strong incentives. 
Table Two illustrates the magnitude of equity incentives held by U.S. CEOs 
relative to their pay. The Table shows data on annual compensation and beginning-of-
year portfolio value and incentive data for S&P 500 CEOs from 1993-2003 (the data and 
computations are described in greater detail in the appendix). Column One shows total 
annual pay for the median CEO. The second column shows the beginning-of-year market 
value of the median CEO’s stock and option portfolio. The third column shows a measure 
of the median CEO's beginning-of-year incentives. Following the method developed by 
Jensen and Murphy,37 we measure incentives as the increase (decrease) in the value of the 
CEO's stock and option portfolio that occurs when the stock price increases (decreases) 
by 1%. For an example of the interpretation of this measure, consider the median CEO in 
1993. Suppose that this CEO's firm experienced a return of -20% during the year. Then 
the CEO's portfolio would decrease in value by $8.6 million (= -20 times $430,000 in 
incentives). Thus, as discussed by Hall and Liebman, these CEOs can lose large amounts 
                                                 
36 Brian Hall and Jeff Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 653 (1998). 
37. Jensen and Murphy, supra note 18. 
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of their wealth when prices fall.  Note that this $8.6 million decrease is larger than the 
median CEO's pay for 2003 of $6.6 million.  
Table Two illustrates the Hall and Liebman point that because of their large stock 
and option portfolios, U.S. CEOs experience very large wealth changes when the stock 
price changes. In other words, U.S. CEO compensation is structured very much like the 
“Portfolio Incentives” example above: Large stock prices will cause large changes in the 
value of the CEO’s portfolio and wealth even though changes in annual pay may be fairly 
small. Consequently, U.S. CEOs have very large pay-performance incentives, and an 
assertion that U.S. CEOs receive “pay without performance” is clearly inconsistent with 
the evidence. However, it is easy to see why this is what Hall and Liebman call a 
“common view” and a common mistake. If one does not consider the very large 
incentives delivered by CEO equity portfolios, one could come to the false conclusion 
that CEOs have low incentives because their pay does not vary strongly with 
performance.   
In a related vein, one must consider executive incentive levels in any analysis of 
whether executive pay levels are appropriate, because ignoring the very large incentives 
delivered by U.S. CEO equity portfolios could lead one to the false conclusion that U.S. 
CEOs were overpaid. It is widely agreed, and accepted by Bebchuk and Fried, that firms 
should provide incentives that link managerial wealth to firm performance. Imposing 
incentives on the CEO benefits the firm because it aligns the CEO's and the shareholders' 
objectives: when shareholders' wealth increases or decreases, so does the CEO's.  At the 
same time, however, greater incentives come at a cost because executives require greater 
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pay to bear the risks associated with greater incentive levels.38 An executive who is 
required to bear $10 million in incentives will require more pay than if she was required 
to bear only $5 million in incentives. 
 Many misconceptions about the magnitude of U.S. CEO pay arise because the 
observer did not consider (1) the magnitude of U.S. CEO incentives, and (2) that higher 
pay is necessary when incentives are higher. For example, U.S. CEOs have higher pay 
than their European and Japanese counterparts, which could lead the naive observer to 
conclude that U.S. CEOs are overpaid. Yet, U.S. CEOs’ incentives are much higher as 
well, suggesting that their compensation needs to be higher to account for the additional 
risk they bear. Conyon and Murphy’s study of executive compensation in the U.K. 
illustrates this point: they found that U.S. CEOs in 1997 made about 2.7 times more than 
their British counterparts, but that U.S. CEOs also held 4.2 times more stock.39  Given the 
larger incentives held by U.S. CEOs, it is not clear U.S. CEOs are overpaid relative to 
their British counterparts.  
This predicted economic relation between incentives and pay can also be applied 
to the growth in CEO pay over the last decade, the same growth that Bebchuk and Fried 
use to motivate their book (p. 1): 
During the extended bull market of the 1990s, executive compensation at public 
companies – companies whose shares are traded on stock exchanges – soared to 
unprecedented levels.  
 
                                                 
38 Bebchuk and Fried recognize that efficient contracting predicts that pay will be higher when incentives 
are higher: “Linking compensation to performance may require a company to increase an executive’s level 
of compensation because pay that is sensitive to performance is less valuable than fixed pay with the same 
expected value.” (p. 19) 
39 Martin J. Conyon and Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, 110 Econ. J. F640 (2000).  This is a comparison of median data for CEOs in 1997 
that run companies with 200-500 million pounds of sales. 
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Bebchuk and Fried want to use this pay growth as prima facie evidence of a problem with 
pay. What is wrong with this approach is the following. If efficient contracts call for an 
increase in CEO incentives over time, this increases the amount of risk that these 
executives bear, and make it optimal for pay to rise with the increased incentives. 
Accordingly, it is not correct to point to the growth in pay as a problem without 
considering the growth in incentives. If there is a large growth in pay without a 
corresponding growth in incentives, this is stronger evidence of problems with pay. 
However, if pay and incentives grow simultaneously, this growth is consistent with 
efficient contracting. 
Table Two shows that during the period from 1993 to 2003 high pay growth went 
hand-in-hand with high growth in incentives. Column One illustrates that the median 
CEO’s total pay increased from $2 million in 1993 to $6.6 million in 2003, an annual 
increase of 12.7% over the ten-year period. Over this same period, however, the market 
value of the median CEO’s beginning-of-year stock and option portfolio grew at almost 
exactly the same rate, from $9.3 million at the beginning of 1993 to $30.1 million at the 
beginning of 2003, or an annual increase of 12.5% (see Column Two).40 Similarly, 
Column Three of Table Two shows that the median incentives provided by the CEOs’ 
beginning-of-year stock and option portfolios increased from $125,000 for each 1% 
increase in the stock price in 1993 to $430,000 for each 1% increase in the stock price in 
2003, or an annual growth of 13.2%. These statistics are consistent with efficient 
contracts that pay more as: (1) incentives grow, and (2) as the size and complexity of the 
organization grows. 
                                                 
40 During this time, the size of the median S&P 500 firm also increased substantially: the market value of 
the median S&P 500 company increased from $3.6 billion in 1993 to $9.1 million in 2003, or an annual 
increase of 9.6% over the ten years ended 2003. 
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We want to emphasize that the fact that pay and incentives grow at the same rate 
does not imply that pay is necessarily optimal. For example, CEOs could have been 
overpaid both in 1993 and in 2003. In addition, pay growth is optimal only if the 
incentive growth is optimal. While Bechuk and Fried take the position that due to their 
power, executives hold too little incentives, one could imagine a recasting of the “outrage 
cost” argument to yield a result that executives hold too much incentives. For example, if 
shareholders got outraged when executives sold stock, powerful executives might agree 
to hold excess incentives in exchange for excess pay.41    
We do not claim that U.S. pay packages are optimal, but we instead point out that 
one can make no claim about the optimality of pay packages if one ignores the major 
source of incentives in those packages. Pay and incentives must be considered together. 
Second, as discussed above, even with a correct understanding of pay and the structure of 
incentives, it is not possible to show that pay is suboptimal without comparing it across 
firms or countries. It is correct that U.S. CEO incentives and pay are large both by recent 
historical standards and relative to other countries, and that they have grown during the 
1990s. However, there is little if any empirical evidence that shows that U.S. CEO pay, or 
its growth, is sub-optimal. As discussed above, Holmstrom and Kaplan find that U.S. 
stock market performance and productivity growth through 2002 are as good as those in 
any other country, offering no evidence that U. S. compensation practices have grown 
worse relative to those in the rest of the world. 
 
 
                                                 
41 As evidenced by their claim that executives have “broad freedom to unwind equity incentives," Bebchuk 
and Fried do not seem to think that share sales are a source of outrage.   See, for example, their discussion 
on p. 178 that suggests low outrage because stock sales are not salient. 
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III.C Do U.S. CEOs receive “windfalls”? 
 
 We turn next to Bebchuk and Fried’s claim that executives are gaining 
“windfalls,” especially in their equity-based pay.  They state: 
When managers are rewarded for market- and sector-wide price movements, 
shareholders’ money is not well spent. (p. 139).  
 
Their complaint about stock and options is that the market component reflects pay that 
does not increase incentives. If these “windfalls” were removed, they go on to say:  
the same amount of incentives can be provided at a lower cost, or more incentives 
can be provided at the same cost. (p. 190). 
 
Embedded in this statement is an assumption that the CEO is being paid too much, which 
the authors have not demonstrated. If the CEO is being paid too much, the statement is 
true for any component of compensation. For example, if the CEO has too much cash 
pay, his pay can be cut or his incentives increased without causing him to quit.  
In this Section, though, we want to focus on why this is an unfair criticism of the 
design of equity compensation. To see why this is wrong in general, consider the 
“Portfolio Incentives” compensation arrangement discussed previously, which imposed 
the optimal level of incentives by requiring the executive to hold $10 million of his 
wealth in firm stock.  Recall that in this example, the executive was being paid the least 
amount that would cause him to agree to the contract, and that the cost-minimizing 
contract also required a compensation payment of $2 million to the executive. Suppose 
that instead of paying this amount in cash, the firm paid the executive in stock worth $2 
million. The executive could sell this stock for cash and obtain $2 million (under the 
simplifying assumption of no trading costs). Stock is an option with an exercise price of 
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$0, so this stock grant is conceptually the same as an option grant, and we use this stock 
grant to illustrate our point.   
 Bebchuk and Fried claim that firms could use market-indexed equity to “either 
create the same incentives for less money or use the same amount of money to create 
more powerful incentives.”42 Our example shows that this claim is not generally correct. 
Suppose the example firm continues to impose $10 million in stock-price risk on the 
executive, but tries to pay less money by giving indexed stock instead of straight stock. 
This indexed stock would be worth less than $2 million, and the executive would quit 
because his pay was lower than that required under the contract. Alternatively, suppose 
that the firm tried to impose more incentives on the executive for the same amount of 
money by paying the executive $2 million in stock but not allowing the executive to sell 
stock in response. Now the executive holds $12 million in stock. These increased 
incentives would raise the risk premium required by the executive, and he would quit 
unless his compensation was increased as well.  
The example above illustrates that so long as an executive is not overpaid, 
incentives and pay must move together, and firms cannot unilaterally increase incentives 
without increasing pay, or vice versa. To show that there is something wrong with option 
plans requires showing that the manager is overpaid. To this point, as we showed earlier, 
although U.S. CEOs receive high pay relative to CEOs in other countries, they also hold 
substantially more incentives than CEOs in other countries. As a result, there is no 
conclusive evidence that U.S. CEO pay is inappropriately high given the incentive risk 
these individuals are required to bear. Further, the fact that stock and options have a 
                                                 
42 P. 190. Although not true in general, the claim will be true when the executive is overpaid. In this case, 
the claim amounts to a statement that it is efficient to cut pay when the executive is overpaid.  
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market component does not imply that a manager is overpaid, nor does it imply that a 
contract is suboptimal. As described above, the purpose of the market component is not 
to provide incentives, but to deliver pay.  
 A further criticism of the authors’ “windfall” argument is that it presumes that 
CEO contracts exhibit “too much” exposure to market performance, and that market-
adjusting stock and options is necessary to remove this excess market exposure. To see 
the flaw in this argument, it is again important to recognize that U.S. CEOs get nearly all 
of their incentives from their stock and option portfolios, as in the “Portfolio Incentives” 
plan. A naïve analysis will call these stock and option portfolios “puzzling” because they 
increase in value when the market portfolio increases in value. The “Portfolio Incentives” 
plan contract, however, increases the manager’s exposure to firm-specific performance, 
without changing his market exposure.   
To see this, remember that the CEO in Table One above with the “Portfolio 
Incentives” plan has $20 million in outside wealth that he prefers to invest in the market 
portfolio. The CEO’s “Portfolio Incentives” contract requires him to place $10 million of 
that wealth in firm stock.  Note that the stock return Rfirm is the sum of the market return 
Rmarket and the firm-specific net-of-market return Rfirm –Rmarket: 
Rfirm = Rmarket + (Rfirm –Rmarket): 
Therefore, when the executive holds $10 million in firm stock, it is the same as if he held 
$10 million in the market index and $10 million in an indexed security with return Rfirm –
Rmarket. The executive’s actual portfolio is no more correlated with market movements 
than the “Pay Incentives” contract.43   
                                                 
43 The idea that non-indexed grants of stock and options do not impose excess market risk on executives is 
becoming well-recognized. Core, Guay and Larcker, supra note 6; Gerald Garvey and Todd Milbourn, 
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 Bebchuk and Fried accept this point: 
Some economists, however, have argued that executives might in fact be 
interested in a market-wide portfolio and, if given cash would invest it in such a 
portfolio. On this view, giving executives conventional options is no more 
puzzling than giving them indexed options plus a large amount of cash. Indeed, 
assuming the managers are likely to invest the cash in a market-wide portfolio, 
giving compensation to them in the form of conventional options might be 
simpler. 
 
We have no quarrel with this analysis. Conventional options may be no more 
puzzling than a combination of indexed options plus a very large amount of 
cash… Our point, simply, is that a large portion of the value of conventional 
options – which have been widely considered to be “performance-based pay” – is 
in fact decoupled from performance. (p. 157).  
 
In other words, there is no “puzzle” about the fact that stock and options are not indexed.  
This practice is completely consistent with optimal contracting, and calling it “windfalls” 
is misleading and wrong.  The point “that a large portion of the value of conventional 
options – which have been widely considered to be ‘performance-based pay’ – is in fact 
decoupled from performance” simply restates the fact that U.S. firms have “Portfolio 
Incentives” pay schemes: it is well known that most CEOs’ incentives come from their 
portfolios and that their annual pay varies little with performance. 
 
III.D. Do U.S. CEOs unwind their incentives? 
 
Bebchuk and Fried further claim that CEOs have broad “freedom to unwind 
incentives,” and that they use this freedom to exercise options and sell stock that the 
shareholders would prefer the CEOs to hold. If a CEO could unwind his or her equity 
holdings at will, one would expect CEOs to hold little if any unrestricted firm stock, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Executive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance 
Evaluation in the Cross Section, 58 Journal of Finance 1557 (2003); Li Jin, CEO Compensation, 
Diversification, and Incentives, 66 Journal of Financial Economics (2002). 
 55
to exercise their options as soon as they became exercisable and far enough in-the-money 
to reap a reasonable fraction of the options’ value.   
This claim is not well-supported, however, by empirical evidence. CEO equity 
holdings are not low in the U.S., but instead are in general larger than in any other 
country. Further, CEO equity holdings are not in decline but, as documented by Hall and 
Liebman and in the data we presented above, have in fact risen substantially over the last 
twenty years. This increase in value over time shows the authors have overstated their 
claim that managers have almost unfettered discretion to sell their vested stock and 
options. As shown in the last column of Table Two, empirically in 2003, the median CEO 
could realize about 53% of the value of his portfolio by exercising and selling vested 
stock and options. These CEOs, however, did not do so.44
Further, Table Two shows a declining trend in the fraction of the CEOs’ portfolio 
that is vested and realizable. This decline stems from the fact that a greater fraction of 
CEOs’ equity portfolios in 2003 is due to option holdings. The value of an option consists 
of the realizable intrinsic value, which is equal to the beginning-of-year stock price less 
the exercise price, plus the time value that comes from expected stock price increases 
over the term of the option. The early exercise of options destroys the time value of the 
options, thereby encouraging the executive to hold options even after vesting. In 2003, 
many CEOs’ options were out-of-the-money, in which case all of the options’ value is 
due to time value. This evidence suggests that an increasing use of options has likely 
                                                 
44 Although there is a declining trend in the percentage of value vested during this time period, 
executives are holding much more equity now than in 1993.  Thus, the dollar value of their vested holdings 
is far greater today than it was ten years ago, even though the fraction of value vested is lower.   
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reduced CEOs’ ability to unwind their incentives and has contributed to the observed 
growth in CEO equity incentives.45  
One might also ask, if CEOs knew that they had bad incentives and would 
conduct future "rent-extraction" activities and make decisions that would destroy value, 
why would they not sell their stock today to avoid these future costs?46  Why would they 
own any stock at all?  After all, if the CEO takes an action to destroy shareholder value, 
that action destroys the value of his or her portfolio as well.  If CEOs were extracting 
rents and could sell stock at will, one would expect the median CEO to own no stock and 
to exercise his options as soon as they became exercisable and far enough in-the-money 
to reap a reasonable fraction of the options’ value.  To summarize, if in fact a CEO could 
sell without constraints, one would expect that CEO to own no stock. 
A final point on unwinding incentives is that, in some cases, it is optimal for the 
firm to allow and even encourage the CEO to sell equity. For example, restricted stock 
and options are sometimes used as a substitute for cash pay. In these cases, the reason for 
granting equity to the CEO is not to increase incentives. As highlighted above, it is costly 
for a firm to impose greater incentives on the CEO than is optimal. Therefore, when 
equity pay is used as a substitute for cash pay, the CEO should be allowed to rebalance 
his portfolio. As another example, consider the case where the stock price has risen 
substantially faster than the market over a number of years. As the CEO’s portfolio of 
                                                 
45 Some of these CEOs could be hedging the firm-specific risk in their equity portfolios through derivative 
securities such as caps and collars that are negatively correlated with firm-specific price changes. These 
instruments can reduce the CEO's exposure to the firm's stock price and the price-based incentives provided 
by their portfolios. Recent research by Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon (2001) indicates that some CEOs use 
these techniques, but the small sample size in Bettis et al. (2001) suggests that this behavior is limited. 
Although it is possible that some CEOs engage in this behavior and do not file required SEC disclosures, 
the fact that secret hedging activities violate SEC disclosure and insider trading rules reduces the likelihood 
that this behavior is widespread. 
46 Even though rational shareholders in equilibrium price-protect against the probability that value-
destruction will occur, the price will still fall at the time the value-destruction becomes certain. 
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stock and options becomes a greater proportion of his overall wealth, incentives could 
increase beyond the optimal level. In addition to the higher risk premiums the CEO will 
demand, unnecessarily high incentives can also cause the CEO to behave in an overly 
risk-averse manner, thereby shunning valuable, but risky, projects. Again, in these 
settings, it is optimal to allow the CEO to exercise options and sell stock to rebalance his 
portfolio.    
 
IV. Concluding Remarks: Does U.S. Corporate Governance Need to be 
Fixed? 
 
To conclude, we briefly summarize our main points and discuss a few of Bebchuk 
and Fried’s policy conclusions.  First, the authors have offered no persuasive evidence 
that CEO pay contracts are systematically suboptimal. In other words, they have provided 
some interesting examples of bad apples, but have not offered evidence or a theory to 
show that the entire barrel is bad. As we discussed in Part II, in many settings where 
managerial power exists, observed contracts anticipate and try to minimize its costs and 
therefore may in fact be optimal. The “optimal contract” and “managerial power” 
perspectives are not competing explanations of executive pay. It is true that contract 
structures reflect CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get more pay, but this fact 
does not mean that CEO pay is not optimized for shareholders, nor does it imply that 
CEO pay needs reform. 
Second, when Bebchuk and Fried advance their central argument that U.S. 
executives’ compensation is inefficient “pay without performance,” they ignore 
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executives’ stock and option portfolios, which are the primary source of their incentives. 
Once we factor in these very large stock and option portfolios, it becomes apparent that 
corporate executives have very large pay-performance incentives. Without considering 
the very large incentives delivered by CEO equity portfolios, one could come to the false 
conclusion that CEOs have low incentives because their annual pay does not vary 
strongly with performance or that CEOs are overpaid. We do not claim that U.S. pay 
packages are optimal, but we instead point out that one can make no claim about the 
optimality of annual pay packages if one ignores the major source of incentives in 
executives’ portfolios.  
Bebchuk and Fried’s policy recommendations for government intervention are 
based on their assessment that executive pay practices are failing, which we do not 
believe to be true. Therefore, we see no broad justification for the policy 
recommendations they give.  Holding this aside, some of their proposals seem sensible. 
For example, we agree that better disclosure on the value of executive pensions and the 
exercise and sale of options and shares would be beneficial.  We also agree that we see no 
reason that stock options should not be expensed for accounting purposes. 
With regards to their more sweeping proposals, however, Bebchuk and Fried have 
not provided evidence of why more needs to be done. They have shown some potential 
benefits from changing governance practices, but have not provided a thorough 
discussion of the costs of these changes, and therefore no means of assessing whether the 
proposed changes have net benefits. For example, it is conceivable that corporate 
governance practices would be improved by increasing director independence through 
implementation of the shareholder nomination rule.  Yet, as we pointed out in Part II.B, it 
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may be too costly and therefore not optimal for a board to be completely independent.  In 
addition, there is a limited pool of qualified outside directors, and increasing the demand 
for talent from that pool is likely to be very costly.  The focus should not be on 
maximizing board independence, but on selecting a board structure that maximizes share 
value, which may include having inside directors and which likely will differ from a 
board structure optimized solely for making compensation decisions.   
Finally, a number of their specific proposals for reforming pay ignore the role 
played by stock and option portfolios.  Because these proposals are based on incomplete 
analysis, or false premises, their merit is questionable.  First, as discussed above, their 
proposal that stock and stock options should be indexed to filter out any general market 
increases ignores key aspects of how equity portfolios provide incentives. The objective 
of requiring executives to hold options is to force the executive to hold less than the 
desired level of some diversified portfolio, and more than the desired level of firm-
specific equity. Traditional stock and options without indexing achieve this objective: 
executives would prefer to liquidate their stock and option portfolio and invest it in a 
diversified portfolio. Any argument for indexed stock and options must show that the 
benefits of creating these new securities exceed their costs, and that the resulting 
securities are more efficient than the existing simple securities currently used to achieve 
the contracting objective.  Second, they propose that more stringent stock and option 
holding requirements should be imposed on top executives. This proposal is based on 
their claim that it is easy for executives to unload stock and that executives hold too little 
incentives. We show that executive equity holdings are large and growing even though 
most of the value of executive’s holdings is vested and tradeable. While it may be useful 
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to impose additional restrictions on executive portfolios, it is important to determine 
whether additional incentives are necessary and to consider the costs of the additional 
incentives. As we have discussed throughout this article, a cost of higher incentives is 
higher pay. Finally, their recommendation that pay be made more sensitive to 
performance stems from a failure to adequately consider the primary source of U.S. 
CEOs’ incentives. U.S. CEOs do in fact have very strong pay-for-performance equity 
incentives (more than in any other country in the world) through their stock and option 
portfolios.  
Overall though, we emphasize that Professors Bebchuk and Fried have written a 
provocative book that is at the center of the current debate about executive compensation.  
Any scholar who wishes to participate in and advance this debate must understand the 
arguments in Pay Without Performance as well as their limitations.  
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Appendix – Data on US CEO pay and incentives 
 
 The data we show in Table Two are annual compensation and incentives of S&P 
500 CEOs from 1993 to 2003.  We use the S&P 500 as a comparison group over time 
because the index is comprised of the largest and most successful companies in the U.S.47  
We use Execucomp as our source for compensation data, and we obtain data on the S&P 
500 composition and on firm market value from Compustat. We require data on CEO 
tenure, and we exclude CEOs who are not in office for a full year.  We also require data 
on the CEO's stock and option ownership at the beginning of the year.  As shown in the 
first column of the Table, these data requirements yield an annual sample of about 400 
CEOs (out of 500 companies).   
The numbers shown are in actual dollars and are not inflation-adjusted. We 
examine medians, not means.48 There are some CEOs in our sample who are paid nothing 
in a year and others who are paid huge amounts.  These outliers distort the average as a 
summary measure, but have no effect on the median.  We therefore use medians to avoid 
the influence of extreme cases in our data, and instead examine what is typical for the 
largest and most successful firms in the world.   
Stock and option portfolios provide CEOs with incentives because they change in 
value with the stock price, an important performance measure over which the CEO exerts 
                                                 
47 The S&P 500 “includes 500 leading companies in leading industries of the U.S. economy. Although the 
S&P 500 focuses on the large-cap segment of the market, with over 80% coverage of U.S. equities it is also 
an ideal proxy for the total market.” Source: S&P 500 factsheet, available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com. 
48 The trend in median data is quite similar to the trend in average data documented by Hall and Murphy 
(2003) and others, and we see the same trend when we look at averages in our data. Brian J Hall and Kevin 
J Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 49 (2003). 
 62
some control.  Following the method developed by Jensen and Murphy,49 we measure 
incentives as the increase (decrease) in the value of the CEO's stock and option portfolio 
that occurs when the stock price increases (decreases) by 1%. Stock holdings increase 
one-for-one with the stock price.  In other words, if the firm has a stock return of 1%, the 
CEO's stock portfolio increases in value by 1%.  If the median CEO in 1993 held all 
stock, his portfolio, which has a value of $9.3 million, would provide $93,000 in 
incentives by this measure.  In other words, when the stock price decreases by 1%, $9.3 
million in stock falls in value by $93,000. But these CEOs own a combination of stock 
and options, and a given dollar amount of options increases (decreases) in value more 
than the same dollar amount of stock.  In other words, if the firm has a stock return of 
1%, the CEO's option portfolio increases in value by more than 1%. To estimate the value 
and incentives provided by the CEO’s option portfolio at the end of a year t, we use the 
method developed by Core and Guay.50 We modify this method by assuming times-to-
exercise equal to 70 percent of the Core and Guay assumed times-to-maturity.  
                                                 
49 Jensen and Murphy, supra note 35. 
50 John E. Core and Wayne R. Guay, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their 
Sensitivities to Price and Volatility 40 Journal of Accounting Research 613 (2002). 
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Table 1 
Comparison of "Pay Incentives" and "Portfolio Incentives" Contracts 
 
"Pay Incentives" - CEO receives salary of $2 million, a bonus that is equal to the product of 
$10 million and the firm's market-adjusted return, and has $20 million of wealth invested in 
the market portfolio. 
        
Firm and market stock returns        
        Firm return -50% 0%  50%   
        Market return 0% 0%  0%   
        Market-adjusted return -50% 0%  50%   
        
CEO compensation and incentives        
        Salary  $      2    $      2    $      2    
        Bonus  $     (5.0)   $        -      $      5.0    
        Change in Firm Stock Value  $        -      $        -      $        -      
        
        Change in market holdings  $        -      $        -      $        -      
        
        Total wealth change  $     (3.0)   $      2    $      7.0    
        
"Portfolio Incentives" – CEO receives salary of $2 million, invests $10 million of wealth in 
firm stock, and has $10 million of wealth invested in market.  
      
Firm and market stock returns        
        Firm return -50% 0%  50%   
        Market return 0% 0%  0%   
        Market-adjusted return -50% 0%  50%   
        
CEO compensation and incentives        
        Salary  $      2    $      2    $      2    
        Bonus  $        -      $        -      $        -      
        Change in Firm Stock Value  $     (5.0)   $        -      $      5.0    
        
        Change in market holdings  $        -      $        -      $        -      
         
        Total wealth change   $     (3.0)   $      2    $      7.0    
 
 64
Table 2 
Median CEO Pay, Portfolio Value, and Incentives for S&P 500 firms: 1993 to 2003 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year Total Annual Pay 
Beginning-of-
Year Portfolio 
Value 
Beginning-of-
Year 
Incentives 
Fraction of 
Value Vested 
1993 $1,983,000 $9,275,000 $125,000 76.7% 
1994 2,444,000 10,306,000 152,000 75.6% 
1995 2,765,000 10,623,000 157,000 70.8% 
1996 3,257,000 13,220,000 191,000 72.8% 
1997 3,989,000 19,574,000 286,000 71.3% 
1998 4,578,000 27,563,000 403,000 69.2% 
1999 5,470,000 37,041,000 492,000 65.9% 
2000 6,947,000 43,484,000 567,000 63.8% 
2001 7,351,000 50,215,000 647,000 60.1% 
2002 6,585,000 38,105,000 552,000 58.8% 
2003 6,578,000 30,137,000 430,000 52.8% 
     
Ten-year  
growth rate 12.7% 12.5% 13.2% -3.7% 
 
 
Total Annual Pay is median CEO salary, bonus, stock and option grants and other pay for 
the year shown. 
 
Beginning-of-Year Portfolio Value is the median total value of stock exercisable and 
unexercisable options held by the CEO at the beginning of the year shown. 
 
Beginning-of-Year Incentives is an estimate of the change in the beginning-of-year value 
of CEO stock and option holdings for a 1% change in stock price. 
 
Fraction of Value Vested is the fraction of beginning-of-year Portfolio Value that the 
CEO could obtain if all vested stock was sold and all vested in-the-money options were 
exercised (For options, the value vested is the intrinsic value, which is equal to the 
beginning-of-year stock price less the exercise price times the number of options).  
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